In this paper we present a new efficient algorithm for factoring the RSA and the Rabin moduli in the particular case when the difference between their two prime factors is bounded.
Introduction
The security of the RSA [11] , and Rabin [10] cryptosystems is based on the hardness of factoring integers. The secret keys can be founded if we succeed in decomposing the modulus which is the product of two large prime factors.
Many authors have addressed the problem and currently the fastest known algorithms are Elliptic Curves Method [5] , and Number Field Sieve [2] . In an exercise, Stinson [12] , has evoked the possibility of factoring the RSA modulus if the two factors are too close. In 1999, Boneh and al. [1] described a polynomial time algorithm for factoring n = p r q when the exponents r is large. More recently, in 2007, Coron an May [3] presented the first deterministic algorithm for factoring the RSA modulus in polynomial time but they used the public and the secret key pair (e, d). Our work consists on giving a simple algorithm for factoring the RSA and the Rabin moduli in the particular case when the difference between the two prime factors is less than 2
where k is the bit-size of the modulus.
The paper is organised as follow: Section 2 is devoted to our main result. In section 3 we discuss an extension but only in its theoretical aspect. We conclude in Section 4.
Throughout the paper, we shall use standard notation. In particular N is the set of all natural integers 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . and N * = N−{0}. The largest integer which does not exceed the real x is denoted by ⌊x⌋. It is also the integer part and the floor of x. Thus we have ⌊x⌋ ≤ x < ⌊x⌋ + 1. The bit-size of a positive integer n is the number of bits in its binary representation. So, the bit-size of n is k, ⇔ n = k−1 i=0 2 i a i with every a i ∈ {0, 1} and
Main Results
We begin with a lemma that we shall use in the proof of our main theorem.
Lemma 2.1 Let n, m be two elements of N * and let α n,m denotes the number of perfect squares x 2 such that n < x 2 ≤ m. Then we have:
its cardinality is ⌊ √ n⌋ + 1 and then α n,m = ⌊ √ m⌋ − ⌊ √ n⌋. If we put k = ⌊ √ n⌋ and
Now we can move to the main theorem which allows us to compute efficiently the two prime factors p and q of an RSA or a Rabin modulus in a particular case. The proof of this theorem relies on the last lemma.
Theorem 2.2 Let n be the modulus of an RSA or a Rabin cryptosystem whose bit-size is denoted by k ∈ N * . If its two prime factors p and q satisfy the inequality |p − q| ≤ 2 k+5 4 , then we can compute them efficiently Proof. First notice that the hypothesis of our theorem can exist in practice: for example when p and q are twin primes. Without loss of generality we can assume that 2 < p < q.
As the factors p and q are odd, we put q = p + 2i where i ∈ N. Since n = pq ⇔ n + i 2 = (p + i) 2 , the integer n + i 2 is a perfect square bounded below by n and above
By the last lemma, the number α n,m of perfect squares between n and m is satisfying the inequality
But α n,m is a natural integer so α n,m = 1. This means that n + i 2 = (p + i) 2 is the only perfect square between n and n + 2 k+1 2 . That is also the first perfect square n 2 0
greater than n and so n 0 = ⌊ √ n⌋ + 1. This allows us to compute the factors p and q :
This theorem leads to the following algorithm where comments are delimited by braces.
Algorithm
Input: A modulus n > 0 with |p − q| ≤ 2 k+5 4 . Output: The two prime factors p and q.
Example 2.3 Let try the method on the mythic example given by the authors of the RSA cryptosystem [11] . They took n = 2773, p = 47 and q = 59. With the algorithm above we retrieve easily the two prime factors. Indeed the first integer square greater than n is
− n = 36 = 6 2 = i 2 and then p = n 0 − i = 47 and q = n 0 + i = 53. Let check that p and q satisfy the condition in the theorem, n = 2773 has k = 12 bits in its binary representation, thus 2
On an other hand there exist integers for which we cannot apply the theorem. Take for example n = 1081. The first, integer square greater than n is n Proof. We have in this situation:
3 Extension of the method
The purpose of this section is to generalize our method. The extension is mainly of theoretical interest. However we can compute factors by "factoring with a hint" [1] , [2] or the help of an oracle. The following proposition shows that, when n = pq is the product of two unknown prime factors, if we can find a prime number r such that rp is close to q, and therefore rn is close to a perfect square, then we can compute p and q. The difficulty of factoring n directly, is transformed into the difficulty of computing this coefficient r.
When this situation occurs, since r is an integer, the factors p and q must be unbalanced [6] . It seems that, in this case, classical algorithms are not very efficient.
Proposition 3.1 Let n ∈ N * be the product of two prime factors p and q, 2 < p < q. If we can compute efficiently an odd integer r > 2 such that |q − rp| ≤ 2
K+5
4 , where K is the bit-size of the integer rn, then we can compute the factors p and q.
Proof. We put N = rn, P = rp and Q = q. So N = P Q and as P and Q are odd we assume that Q > P , and Q = P + 2I. Using a technique like that in the proof of Theorem 2.2 but with the new parameters N, P, Q, K, I instead of n, p, q, k, i, we show that there is only one perfect square between N and N + 2 This leads to a contradiction since r 1 − rp < 0 and r 2 pq − q > 0. We conclude that p is a factor of N 0 − I and q is a factor of N 0 + I and then we can compute them If the factors p and q are balanced which is the case in standard RSA and Rabin cryptosystems [6] , we have the result: Proposition 3.3 Let n ∈ N * be the product of two prime factors p and q, 2 < p < q.
If we can compute efficiently two odd integers r, s such that s < p and |sq − rp| ≤ 2
where K is the bit-size of the integer rsn, then we can compute the factors p and q.
Proof. For simplicity we suppose that sq > rp. The same argumentation as in the proof of Our theoretical method can be extended in order to be applied for factoring any integer n. By the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, every positive integer n can be written as a product of primes. So it n can be made in the form n = f g, where f and g are two factors not necessary prime. If for one couple (f, g) the difference |g − f | is not very large, then we can compute f and g. Proposition 3.5. Let n ∈ N * be the product of two odd factors f and g, 2 < f < g. If
where k is the bit-size of the integer n, then we can compute the factors f and g.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2. There is an other interesting example with m = 2 4α+2 + 1, α ∈ N. (see [4] for α = 53).
The exponent is simply the double of odd integers. The first perfect square grater than m
and q = m 0 + 2 α+1 = 2 2α+1 + 2 α+1 + 1. Observe that m is also a multiple of 5.
The last result in this paper concerns integers n for which no couple of factors (f, g)
4 . In this case we use a coefficient r to correct the situation and work on the new integer rn before coming back to n and compute efficiently one of its factors.
We formulate the idea in the next theorem:
Theorem 3.7. Let n ∈ N * be an odd integer. Assume that we can compute efficiently an odd integer r such that rn becomes the product of two factors f and g such that r < f (or r < g) and |g − f | ≤ 2
, where K is the bit-size of the integer rn, then we can compute a factor of n.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Corollary 2.4. and by looking for the artificial coefficient r we find two factors of n namely f = 89 and g = 1537
Conclusion
We have described a, algorithm for factoring the RSA and the Rabin moduli in a particular case. This class of integers should be avoided in cryptographic applications. The algorithm does not use divisions.We need in the future to ameliorate the bound 2 k+5 4 , in order to include more prime factors.
Furthermore, we have also discussed new ideas about integer factorization. The technique is only theoretical but we believe that it can lead to efficient algorithms for some classes of integers. We underline that in the case of the RSA cryptosystem, we did not use the knowledge of the public and secret key pair (e, d).
